NPO Capacity Development Project

Project Evaluation Report

（English Excerpts）

日本NPOセンター

World Vision
この子を救う。未来を救う。

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All Appendices and Project Documents are not included in the English version.

Executive Summary

This is the project evaluation report of the first stage of the “NPO Capacity Development Project,” organized by the Japan NPO Center (JNPOC) with the financial support of World Vision Japan (WVJ). The project was implemented from May 2012 to July 2013 following a preparation period. Our main purpose in writing this report is to measure the success (evaluate the effectiveness) of our project goals; namely, nonprofit organizational capacity building in three disaster-affected prefectures and the development of nonprofit leadership.

The original report in Japanese includes nine chapters, but this English version only contains excerpts: Chapter 1, part of Chapter 2, part of Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and the conclusion (Chapter 9). In order to preserve coherence with the chapter structure of the Japanese version, we have retained the original chapter and paragraph numbers.

After providing an overview of this evaluation report in Chapter 1, we describe the background for the project's implementation in Chapter 2 and outline the implementation process in Chapter 3. The main section of this report, Chapters 4 and 5, lays out our findings with regard to project effectiveness, which are summarized below. (Chapter 5 aimed to evaluate each component of the project separately, but has been omitted from the English version.)

- One of the most important results of the project was the formation of trusting relationships among the participants, between the participants and their mentors, and between the participants and the project organizers. These relationships constitute a basis for future nonprofit activities.

- The Mentoring Program was formulated as an experimental element - a concrete approach to the so-called “accompaniment” style of support. “Accompaniment” by mentors showed a certain efficacy with regard to human resource development among the participants.

- With regard to changes achieved through the project, the participants were greatly transformed on an individual level, showing striking changes particularly regarding their understanding and knowledge of nonprofits. Organizational change was not as dramatic, but the numbers do show changes that can be interpreted as clear organizational development.

- In our evaluation of the effectiveness of each component of the project, participants reported being most satisfied with the Group Training Session, the curriculum of which was created with the active involvement of the project’s executive committee.

- The Organizational Development Course in the Practical Support Program is believed to have had a positive influence on the organizations that availed of it, as respective organizational leaders and participants were able to use the opportunity to sort through and share organizational issues and possible solutions. The Internship Course allowed participants to view their organizations objectively while physically separated from them, resulting in them returning with ideas that will allow them to revitalize the management and activities of their organizations in the future.

- With regard to the project management system, its decentralized management methods allowed us to ensure the quality of comprehensive and individualized care provided to the participants.

- The two goals of “organizational capacity building” and “development of leadership” for nonprofits proved not to be entirely compatible. Also, there were significant gaps and discrepancies between the expected and actual characteristics and experience levels of the participants, which had an impact on the project's success in achieving its goals. These can be regarded as the project’s flaws in design.

- Some management issues were encountered in the Mentoring Program and Practical Support Program, which hindered the smooth implementation of the project.

Chapters 6 through 8 have not been included in the English version, so we will briefly introduce their content here. Chapter 6 examines organizational issues in the three prefectures where we gathered data during the course of the project through methods such as surveys. The results of this analysis tell us that the organizational issues of participating groups mainly correspond with the topic introduced in the “entry-level” courses (the abilities to propose, construct, predict, maintain, promote, cultivate, and convey), and not many of the participating groups found utilities in topics at the “application” level.

Next, Chapter 7 details the scale of financial and human resources invested into this project, after which Chapter 8 offers a perspective that lays out some preparatory questions for furthering the discussion of the relationship between nonprofit organizational capacity building and citizen-centric earthquake reconstruction efforts. In order to evaluate this “relevance” question (as used in the evaluation jargon), we must construct a “theory of change.” In order to construct this theory, we introduce some discussion elements that can be used in this formulation, including the Japan NPO Center's earthquake reconstruction support project, the global movement that uses “community resilience” as a key concept, and the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin Earthquake. We then offer four possible logical bridges between nonprofit capacity building and citizen-centric earthquake reconstruction: the issue of leadership, the power of community, the levels of organizational capacity building, and the different levels of support offered by outsiders.

In Chapter 9, we state our conclusions and recommendations. Among these, we touch on the need to further popularize the “accompaniment” style of support and recommend advocating for it to become a subject of public policy. Moreover, we point out that the efficacy of this project can be increased even further by using the networks created through the project to strengthen the nonprofit community in the region. We also point out the importance of carefully handling the situational variables of mega-earthquakes or other disasters in project development. Finally, we close this report by stating the need to routinize vigorous evaluation work in carrying out any project, in order to be able to see, share and learn about the successes and challenges of the project.

Chapter 1:
Overview of the Project Evaluation Report

1.1. Scope of Project Evaluation

In discussion with the project sponsor, World Vision Japan (WVJ), the Japan NPO Center agreed that the NPO Capacity Development Project (“the project”) should be properly evaluated. As a part of the agreement, we decided that this project evaluation would result in the creation of two documents: first, this project evaluation report (“main project evaluation”) would evaluate the preparation period and the first stage of the project; then, a set of case studies (“supplementary project evaluation”) would take a more detailed look at individual events in both the first and second stages of the project. According to this design, this report examines the preparation period and the first stage, which consists of (1), (2), and (3) in the box below.

1.2. Goals of Project Evaluation

The goals of the project evaluation as stated in the Project Evaluation Plan created through exchange between WVJ and the Japan NPO Center are as follows.

1. To articulate the ways in which the project contributed to its objectives of nonprofit organizational capacity building and leadership development in the three disaster-stricken prefectures; to demonstrate the project outcomes to donors, project organizers, beneficiaries and other stakeholders of the project (evaluation of effectiveness as a main goal).

2. To analyze and draw out what the project has taught us about the state of nonprofits in the three prefectures and examine the relevance of the project in terms of how its objectives of nonprofit organizational capacity building and leader development is linked to the (supposed) higher goal of citizen-centric reconstruction from the disaster (evaluation of relevance as a secondary goal).

3. To investigate recognizable changes that have taken place in the status of nonprofits in the three prefectures as a result of the project, as well as the roles fulfilled and contributions made by the project (evaluation of impact as a secondary goal).

4. To share the knowledge gained and lessons learned through the project with a wide audience so that the Japan NPO Center and other centers supporting nonprofits throughout the country can take them into consideration when carrying out similar projects (evaluation of the sustainability/multiplier effect as a main goal).

NPO Capacity Development Project

<Preparation Period>

December 2011	Start of project
February 2012	Establishment of project executive committee, determination of project outline
March 2012	Selection of on-site project staff and mentors
April 2012	Selection of participants

<First Stage>

May-August 2012	(1) Group Training Program implemented
September-July 2013	(2) Mentoring Support Program implemented
	(3) Practical Support Program implemented

<Second Stage>

August 2013-July 2014	(4) Grant Program for Strengthening Organizational Capacities implemented

The relationship between these goals and the five evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC), being relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability, is presented in Appendix 1.

As planned from the very beginning, the main focus of the evaluation is evaluating the project's effectiveness, and so particular emphasis is placed on Goal 1 (and Goal 4 to a lesser extent) among the four above-mentioned goals. The evaluation of efficiency, which is related to Goal 1 and Goal 2 (relevance) are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 of the project report, respectively, but we must acknowledge the insufficiency of these aspects. Most of the evaluation of impact under Goal 3's has been relegated to an additional project report, tentatively entitled "A Set of Case Studies from the NPO Capacity Development Project." Work on this will commence upon completion of this project evaluation. For further explanation, please see "Limitations of the Project Evaluation" below.

1.3. Project Evaluation Team and Approach

The project evaluation was carried out by the Japan NPO Center's internal project evaluation team (see Appendix 2, "Composition of Project Evaluation Team"), and in this sense, it may be viewed as an internal evaluation. The main author of the report, however, was not involved in the implementation of the project, and this report can therefore also be viewed as a third party evaluation. In particular, we would like to make a note that the main author was responsible for writing Chapter 8.

In order to preserve the neutrality of our evaluation as much as possible, we have grounded our report not only on information collected from surveys, "visualization sheets" and similar outputs during the project, but also on information that we were able to gather from evaluation surveys from the project evaluation stage, including interviews with participating individuals and organizations (as well as additional surveys), mentor group interviews (as well as associated surveys), project staff interviews, interviews with WVJ, and other interviews (see Appendix 3: "Sources of Data Contributing to Project Report").

1.4. Limitations of This Project Evaluation

As also stated in the Project Evaluation Plan, the greatest limitation of this project evaluation is the fact that no evaluation criteria had been agreed upon before the project commenced. Accordingly, there were no quantified indicators for the evaluation agreed upon in advance, either. This means that although we can, to an extent, convert the survey results into numerical data, we cannot use such information to measure the degree of success against the project's initial goals. Because of this limitation, the evaluation of project efficiency in Chapter 7 avoids making general conclusions and restricts itself to a detailed account of financial figures.

Moreover, with regard to Goal 2 of the project evaluation goals (evaluation of relevance), the relationship between the objectives of nonprofit organizational capacity building and leadership development on the one hand and the project's higher goals on the other – beginning with the question of what these higher goals should be - has not been discussed fully among the project organizers and stakeholders, which is a major limitation in evaluating relevance. We discuss this in Chapter 8.

Furthermore, the evaluation of impact under Goal 3 is a challenge due to the difficulty of weeding out the influence of factors external to the project. Naturally, we are unable to determine whether or not the transformations that occurred were a result of the project. In addition, the project took place during a period of dizzying change for the disaster-affected regions, and the circumstances of the participating individuals and organizations changed greatly due to various types of outside influence as well. Finally, it would exceed the boundaries of this project evaluation to account for the influence that transformations in participating individuals and organizations had – whether as a direct result of the project or not - on their communities or field of activity, primarily because of the lack of primary data needed to form an argument.

As stated, a set of case studies will be compiled separately from this report as a supplementary project evaluation report. Through the process of creating this, we will shed light on the changes that have taken place in the individuals and organizations, and in the communities where they work (project impact), by examining case studies about the participating individuals and organizations through interviews and collecting data that include information on the surrounding circumstances. By these means, we believe that we will be able to convey multiple aspects of the project outcomes to a wider society.

1.5. Intended Readers

Despite the limitations mentioned above, the evaluation team believes that by examining the various types of data in detail with the main goal of evaluating effectiveness, we will be able to extract and share "lessons" that will benefit the participating individuals and organizations, mentors, project organizers and donors.

We would like this evaluation report to be read by the above-mentioned project stakeholders, as well as by those involved in the nonprofit sector both in and outside of the disaster-affected regions; official and private donors and project managers with an interest in “accompaniment”-style support for leadership development; policy makers and organizations involved in the formulation and execution of earthquake reconstruction policies; research organizations and scholars; and evaluation experts. Our team will be delighted if these readers can make effective use of this report on the path toward the reconstruction of Tohoku.

Chapter 2: Background

The Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, was an unprecedented disaster. It was characterized by the immense scale and wide scope of the damage it caused. Government buildings in the regions were also damaged, leaving government functions paralyzed. Initially, it was difficult to grasp the extent of the damage and rescue activities could not proceed smoothly. Furthermore, problems in the disaster-stricken areas were complicated by the fact that this was a "complex disaster" that combined an earthquake, a tsunami, and a nuclear accident, and this slowed down all recovery efforts.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, both domestic and foreign aid poured in, and a large number of groups were involved in relief activities in the region, especially in the three prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. Below, we review some dimensions of the relief and assistance efforts and the surrounding external environment, and thereby summarize the background of the project during the period covered by this project evaluation (February 2012 through July 2013).

2.1. Increase of Nonprofit Organizations in the Three Disaster-Affected Prefectures

Focusing on the number of nonprofits, we find that after the earthquake, there has been an increase in the three prefectures of new groups obtaining the status of NPO, or "Specified Nonprofit Corporation." Table 1 and Figure 1 show a comparison between changes in the number of nonprofits in the three prefectures and in the country as a whole. Comparing the number of nonprofit organizations per million people in 2013 to the number that existed before the earthquake in 2010, we can see an increase of 45% in Iwate, 39.4% in Miyagi, and 45.8 % in Fukushima prefectures, as opposed to the national average rate of increase of 28.2%. Among the three prefectures, Fukushima had a rate of 400 nonprofit organizations per one million people, exceeding the national average. Beyond Specified Nonprofit Corporations, many "General Incorporated Associations" and unincorporated groups were also formed to aid in the relief and recovery efforts. We can also see that many groups were formed outside these prefectures to support evacuees and to engage in other support activities.

Table 1: Number of Specified Nonprofit Corporations in the Three Disaster-Affected Prefectures

	Iwate			Miyagi			Fukushima			All prefectures		
	Newly incorporated	Cumulative	Number per 1 million people	Newly incorporated	Cumulative	Number per 1 million people	Newly incorporated	Cumulative	Number per 1 million people	Newly incorporated	Cumulative	Number per 1 million people
2010	24	319	240	54	549	234	50	557	275	3,419	38,117	298
2011	38	357	272	50	599	257	62	619	311	3,649	41,766	327
2012	53	410	312	87	686	296	76	695	351	3,723	45,489	354
2013	40	450	342	73	759	327	82	778	393	3,100	48,589	378
Rate of Increase (2013/2010)			43%			40%			43%			27%

Figure 1: Number of Specified Nonprofit Corporations in the Three Disaster-Affected Prefectures (per 1 million people)



2.2. Support Activities by Nonprofit Organizations from Other Prefectures and International Development NGOs

Support activities for people and areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake were carried out not only by local groups, but also groups from other parts of the country. According to the 2013 Plan of Activities of the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN), a network of support groups that was formed in response to the earthquake, there were 853 JCN member groups at the end of March 2013. Among these, 183 (21. 5%) were located in the Tohoku region, while 670 groups (78.5%) were located outside the Tohoku region and carrying out support activities.

Furthermore, the massive scale of the Great East Japan Earthquake was widely reported overseas, and great amounts of monetary donations poured in from abroad, along with support from international development NGOs that had never provided support for domestic disasters before. According to the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), 34 out of a total of 96 member groups of JANIC were involved in activities that provided support for victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake.[2]

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2.5. Conditions for Nonprofit Organizations in the Three Prefectures

Let us now examine the conditions surrounding the groups that are active in the three disaster-affected prefectures. In particular, we will examine the external environment from April 2012 over a period of about a year and a half, during which this project was implemented. Note that the account below is based on the results of project evaluation group interviews with those who participated in the project, and it has not been substantiated by other means. This is not an objective summary of conditions and facts related to the three prefectures during this period, but rather a list of changes and significant events as recalled by the participants.

2.5.1 Trustworthiness of Nonprofit Organizations

The "Daisetsu River Net" incident[12] was a major scandal that shook perceptions of the trustworthiness of nonprofits, especially in Iwate prefecture. Daisetsu River Net was a nonprofit organization located in Asahikawa, Hokkaido, and inn December 2012, its leader was arrested on suspicion of business embezzlement from a 2011 contracted employment project (budget of 790 million yen) in Yamada town, Iwate prefecture. In addition, the trial over the Iwate NPO Center incident[13] was in progress at around the same time. Compounded by the proliferation of newspaper and other media reports headed by the term "nonprofit," an over-generalized perception of nonprofits being untrustworthy ran amok. As a result, distrust of nonprofits has intensified among local residents, who had generally held a positive view of nonprofit activities in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Moreover, this has had a number of complicating effects on nonprofit activities in general. The accounting report requirements for government contracts in the prefectures became more stringent, and the amount of paperwork required for submission increased. This issue was not limited to Iwate, but also impacted nonprofit organizations in the other disaster-affected regions of Miyagi and Fukushima.

2.5.2. Use of Emergency Job Creation Program

There are many groups that hired workers through the central government's emergency job creation program, which has been effective to the extent of providing job opportunities for people who lost their jobs due to the earthquake and nuclear disaster, as well as people trying to launch support activities. The program, however, was usually operated under the limitation of a one-year contract system, leading to instability for both workers and employers and making it difficult for long-term activity planning. Furthermore, the program targeted disaster-affected job seekers, so it did not apply to people from other prefectures or those returning to the region after living in other parts of the country.

It can usually be said that most people working for nonprofits are highly conscious of social issues, but among those hired under the emergency program, many just took the job as a way to earn a living and did not necessarily have a passion for tackling social issues. This is not surprising and we have no intention of passing any moral judgment; however this may have affected the organizations working on support activities in gaining consensus regarding their internal organizational mission and the need for nonprofit capacity building as promoted by this project.

Moreover, the salary standards established for the emergency program were often based on the salaries of contracted workers in the local government, and in some cases did not correspond with private sector wages. For this reason, some local businesses complained that they were unable to recruit enough workers because the wages they offered were not as high as those offered under the emergency program. Meanwhile, there were also complaints from nonprofit organizations that the salary standards of the emergency program were too low for the caliber of people they wanted to hire, and they were thus unable to obtain the human resources they needed.

2.5.3. Radiation Issues Resulting from the Nuclear Accident

This disaster was a complex emergency, greatly affected by the nuclear accident in addition to the earthquake and tsunami. Radiation-related problems due to the nuclear accident were especially severe in Fukushima, and different views and positions on the matter developed among the groups carrying out support activities. In the end, it was as if each group was being asked to make up its mind and come to certain ideological position and make it public, which made it difficult for groups to cooperate and work together.

Views on radiation not only affect the relationships between groups, but also those among people within the same group, sometimes causing support activities to come to a halt. The people involved in support activities were themselves working under a state of instability, with no or little future prospects in sight. Such problems continue to this day, and this state of affairs has meant that nonprofits, especially those in evacuation zones and neighboring areas, must operate under conditions that are extreme even for a disaster are. This includes the inability to make medium and long-term plans, as well as extreme difficulties in securing human resources.

2.5.4. Changes in the Needs of Disaster Areas

When this project began in April 2012, it was a period of time when people affected by the disaster were facing a second wave of turmoil as they moved into temporary housing, and their collective needs were difficult to determine. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the number of nonprofits within the prefectures increased, a great deal of external financial aid poured in, and almost anyone could participate in support activities. As time went on, however, the activities became more streamlined, and there was a transition away from immediate relief work to more sustained activities that responded to longer-term needs. Moreover, there were changes in the nature of support networks, which evolved from simply connecting the groups involved into providing support. It was then realized that there was a newly-identified need for a more substantive, specialist form of cooperation, which sometimes had an impact on the very nature of organizations that provided support. Also, this was the time when support groups from outside the prefectures began to withdraw, taking away the knowhow necessary for sustained activities, and local nonprofits grew conscious of the problem that local groups were not developing their capacities. As a response, during this period, training projects with the goal of organizational capacity building gradually increased.

2.5.5. Changes in the Consciousness of the Disaster-Affected Population

This period also saw changes in the consciousness of the disaster-affected population. At the risk of over-generalizing, their attitude shifted from asking “Why are you coming to see the disaster zone? (We don't need rubberneckers!),” to saying “We want you to come and see this place.” This can also be understood as the emergence of feelings among the locals regarding the long road to reconstruction that still lies ahead - that the disaster isn't over yet, and they don't want people to forget what happened. Some have taken on the role of storyteller out of a sense of responsibility stemming from having directly experienced the disaster.

At the same time, a gap in consciousness formed between the locals and the outsiders. As the fiscal year changed, there were more inquiries from people wishing to donate supplies or provide their help. The local residents and nonprofits receiving this help, however, became worried about becoming dependent on such support, and outside support was sometimes closely scrutinized or even rejected during this period. People were afraid of losing initiative, of falling into the habit of thinking that they did not have to work because others would help them, and of being deprived of the spirit of independence to drive them to get back on their feet and work. The more the number of nonprofits closely tied to the community, the more they felt it necessary to break away from such situation.

Even a year after the Great East Japan Earthquake, a state of uncertainty lingered on, and no one was able to demonstrate a course of action for reconstruction or visualize the future. As these conditions dragged on, many people began to internalize the problems and stop talking. Moreover, the problem emerged of deteriorating relationships between the original residents and evacuees from the coastal area, even within the three prefectures.

2.5.6. Social Issues that Have Surfaced since the Earthquake

The three prefectures were regions where depopulation and aging had already advanced before the earthquake. Although some young people did return to the area after the earthquake, they evacuated disproportionately from the three prefectures - partially due to radiation concerns – and this accelerated the population decline. In addition, for reasons such as lack of space in the temporary housing facilities for evacuees, large families have been split up, and the elderly are even more isolated now. Furthermore, problematic behavior among children has increased due to the various psychological burdens created by the earthquake, while adults have suffered from depression, insomnia, and frustration over their inability to find work. There has been an increase in deaths that may be related to the earthquake.

It seems apparent that the problems in the afflicted regions that existed before the earthquake have become more severe during the period in which this project was implemented.

2.6. The Need for Organizational Capacity Building

Immediately after the earthquake, the number of groups offering financial support for relief and support activities increased, and the ability to secure funding was a great encouragement for groups involved in support activities. Many of the newly formed groups, however, lacked a well-ordered organizational structure as they experienced a sudden influx of support (funds, items, people) from outside. In addition, groups that had previously worked on a small scale found the scope of their activities and their field significantly broadening after the earthquake, and some saw a dramatic increase in their budget and number of staff members. This state of affairs was mockingly known as the "earthquake bubble," and as the name suggests, was a temporary situation. As soon as the support disappeared, an element of instability emerged, as groups lost the ability to conduct activities and hire workers.

According to the JCN report, the number of groups in the network that carried out support activities in the 2012 fiscal year (by the end of March 2013), two years after the earthquake, had fallen to 64% of the total membership of 853, and one year later, in late March 2014, it had fallen further to approximately half (53%) of the total. As time passed, emergency relief projects ceased, local needs changed, and the amount of funds flowing into the region decreased, with the result that many of the groups that had started operating after the earthquake disbanded. In particular, there was a tendency for many of the groups that had received support from outside the prefectures to plan to hand over their activities to local groups, or simply withdraw. This trend was already beginning to occur two years after the end of the emergency phase.

As the emergency relief response gave way to the reconstruction phase, it was time for each group to consider the need for organizational building, and think about issues such as a long-term plan, an appropriate organizational and project scale, and financial conditions. It is easy to imagine, however, that as circumstances in the disaster area become more long-term and complex, many groups did not have time to think about such things.

Amid these circumstances, the Japan NPO Center devised this project based on the awareness that there was an urgent need for organizational structuring and capacity building among groups working to support the long reconstruction process ahead.

[Notes]

1. Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief of the East Japan, Fiscal Year 2013 Plan of Activities

2. Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) website, Great East Japan Earthquake NGO activities, http://www.janic.org/earthquake/list/action.html

12. Daisetsu River Net: A nonprofit organization located in Asahikawa, Hokkaido, which registered as a Specified Nonprofit Corporation in 2005. Its activities included the environmental protection of the Ishikari River valley and leadership training for municipal rescue squads. In the 2011 fiscal year, Yamada town in Iwate prefecture contracted this group with an employment project budgeted at 790 million yen. In December 2012, however, it was discovered that the organization had only 750,000 yen remaining, and Yamada town decided to discontinue the project. 137 employees were let go. On May 15, 2013, the Tokyo District Court ruled to begin bankruptcy procedures. The total liability was around 560 million yen. On February 4, 2013, the head of the organization was arrested on suspicion of business embezzlement.

13. Iwate NPO Center: In October 2009, it was discovered that a project related to green tourism (contracted by Iwate prefecture) had involved document forgery and work being assigned to employees who lacked tourism certification. Afterwards, other examples of corruption came to light, such as bribery at the contract management facility and inadequate appropriation of subsidies from financial organizations (forged acceptance forms), and all the directors resigned. The new directors attempted a comeback, but on December 10, 2010, they filed for bankruptcy in the Morioka District Court. The total liability was 32.1 million yen.

Chapter 3: Implementation Outline

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3.2. Project Structure

3.2.1. Project Outline

One of the major aims of this project was to provide the participants with comprehensive support that would go beyond their completion of the group training course, to allow them to put what they had learned into practice. The project was designed to assist the participants through mentors, who would guide them towards this end.

Potential project participants were asked to clearly identify the problems that they or their organizations were dealing with. Over a period of four months, the successful candidates attended a group-training course entitled "15 Management Capabilities to Improve NPOs," which aimed to strengthen organizational capacity. They also worked towards acquiring the organizational management knowledge required of leaders of such organizations. Participants were then matched with mentors, who provided them with support over the 11 months to follow. During this period, they were assisted in activities aimed at resolving their organizational issues and were given an opportunity to intern at another organization. The core intent of this project's design can be seen through these components, with its aim to provide comprehensive support in the resolution of organizational issues (Figure 2).

NPO Capacity Development Project:
Project Summary

* **AIM:** To aid in the revitalization of disaster-affected areas by working side-by-side with nonprofit organizations to cultivate and strengthen their capacity, and to practically and comprehensively cultivate nonprofit leadership in the affected areas.
* **TOTAL BUDGET:** 150,000,000 Yen
* **FRAMEWORK:**
  1. Group Training Course for Organizational Capacity Building (with additional training if needed)
  2. Mentoring Program
  3. Grant Program for Strengthening Organizational Capacities
  4. Internship Program
  5. Creation of training materials

=== *text omitted here* ===

Figure 2



Chapter 4: Project Evaluation (1)
Evaluation of Overall Project Effectiveness

This chapter and the one that followscribe the outcomes of the project evaluation based on the latter's aims and approaches as described in Chapter 1, and discuss the project's effectiveness.

4.1. Relationships of Trust, Camaraderie and Networking

The first major outcome of the project raised here is the mutual trust that developed among the participants, between the participants and their mentors, and between the participants and the project organizers. These relationships of trust have laid the basis for future nonprofit activities. Figure 3 shows the participants' responses to the project evaluation survey regarding the topic of what they had gained by joining the project. As shown, over 70% of respondents said that they had gained a basic knowledge of nonprofit organizations and a network within their prefecture, and over half mentioned attaining "an understanding of the work of other organizations" and "a camaraderie (group spirit)." Among these responses, the networks and camaraderie developed are particularly expected to serve as valuable assets for the participants and their organizations in the medium to long-term future.

4.1.1. Participant Satisfaction

It goes without saying that in the case of continued projects such as this, the enthusiasm of the participants and their attitude towards the project greatly impacts the outcomes. Their overall satisfaction with the project is therefore a major indicator in measuring project effectiveness. As the project evaluation did not, however, qualitatively measure participant enthusiasm and attitudes over time, it is impossible to summarize how they changed (although a sense of it can be gleaned through the surveys and check sheets completed at key points of the process). We therefore look instead at the participants' post-project observations.

The Net Promoter Score (NPS) method (used in the marketing industry) was employed in this evaluation process. The participants and mentors were asked what they thought of the project as a whole during group interviews that were held during the project evaluation stage. NPS classifies the consumers of products and services into three groups based on their satisfaction levels in an attempt to quantify reputation and customer loyalty.

The consumer is asked: "How likely is it that you would recommend our product/service to a friend or colleague?" to which there are 11 levels of response, from 0 to 11 (0=Not at all likely, 10=Extremely likely).[1] Respondents are categorized into the following three groups:

Promoters: 9-10 (would buy/use it again, would recommend it to others)
Passives: 7-8 (neither recommend nor criticize)
Detractors: 0-6(critical, would say negative things about it to others)

The NPS score is calculated as follows:

NPS=Promoters/Total (%) - Detractors/Total (%)

For example, if a survey is taken of a hundred people regarding a certain product and 25 people are "Promoters" and 13 are "Detractors," the NPS is:

NPS=25%(25/100)–13% (13/100)=12 points[2]

Naturally, the higher the ratio of Detractors to Promoters is, the lower the NPS. In general, the average NPS is between 10 and 15 points.[3] In the case of companies, it is common that they assess their points based on a comparison of their products/ services with those of other companies.

Figure 3



The NPS method was used experimentally in this project evaluation to gauge how the participants and mentors felt about the project.[4] The project period under review was from April 2012 to July 2013, and the group interviews through which the NPS method was applied took place from January to February 2014, about six months after the project's end. The participants can thus be regarded as having had the ability (to an extent) to reflect objectively upon their experiences.

Table 6 shows the NPS of the project participants, and the total score for the three prefectures is 32 points, which is relatively high. It is interpreted as there being 32 more Promoters than Detractors in a group of 100 participants. Among the different project components, the group-training course scored highest at 38 points, and the internship course scored lowest at 13 points. Iwate's low score of 8 points stands out among the total scores for each prefecture, given that Fukushima and Miyagi scored highly with 50 and 40 points respectively.

The project had 64 participants when it first began, and as the NPS sample was only 37,[5] these scores should not be relied upon too much in forming judgments. However, the results do serve as a certain indicator of strong satisfaction with the project in general, particularly regarding the project as a whole and the group-training course.

4.2. Project Design Reflections

The abovementioned camaraderie or group spirit among the participants was apparent upon meeting with them, but it became clear in the early stages of the project evaluation that a number of things had to be considered in terms of the project's design. Below are two points that stood out in particular.

4.2.1. Dual Goals

As mentioned in the Implementation Outline, this project had two aims to fulfill in the disaster areas: to strengthen the capacity of nonprofit organizations, and to cultivate leadership. More specifically, the project aimed to strengthen the capacity of various organizations through the participation of their staff. This process is illustrated in Figure 4. Among the project components, the group-training course allowed people other than staff from the participating organizations to join. Only project participants, however, could avail of the mentoring offered, and these mentors did not offer direct consulting services with the organizations. Further, although the organizations were the recipients of the Grant Program for Strengthening Organizational Capacities, there was a condition requiring that the staff member actually participating in the project be put in charge of running the grant activity. In one case, a participant resigned from the organization after the grant was made but before the capacity building activities were implemented, and this resulted in the organization having to refund the grant. The internship component was the same: only project participants were able to take advantage of the opportunity.

Regarding goal-setting and structure, the mentors, who became heavily involved in the management of the project (many were also on the project's executive committee) expressed concern that it was ambitious, if not impossible, to aim for both organizational capacity building and leadership development. The gist of their argument was as follows:

Organizational capacity building and leadership development are different in nature, and so the types of support and connections needed to achieve each are different.

If the main objective of the project is organizational capacity building, the "entry point" would not be restricted to individuals, and it would be better to resolve organizational issues by meeting the needs of the organization through involvement in multiple ways (i.e. organizational consulting). This will be discussed further below, but regarding mentoring in particular, there was a strong consciousness among the mentors that the project not involve organizational counseling. Regardless of whether contact had been made with the organizations' presidents or core staff members, the mentors refrained from advising the organizations other than through the participants.

If, on the other hand, the main objective of the project is leadership development, the project is linked to particular participants who clear the screening process, which, to be straightforward, should mean that even if that person resigns from the organization, he or she should not have to leave the project as a result.

Several mentors were concerned that this method of strengthening organizational capacity through individual participants resulted in too many unnec-

Table 6

	Iwate		Miyagi		Fukushima		Total	
	Score	Respond-ents	Score	Respond-ents	Score	Respond-ents	Score	Respond-ents
Overall Project	8	13	40	10	50	14	32	37
Group Training	31	13	50	10	36	14	38	37
Mentoring Program	0	13	50	10	31	13	25	36
Organizational Development Course (Grant Program)	25	12	33	9	25	12	27	33
Internship Course	40	10	-17	6	0	8	13	24

essary constraints.

Of course, it is not the case that the two goals of strengthening organizational capacity and cultivating leadership cannot coexist. Rather, if one is the goal, the other often arises as a subsidiary effect. The relationship between these two goals, however, and particularly from the point of view of whether the beneficiary is the organization or the individual (or both), was a matter that required careful consideration in designing this project. For example, the "Project to Support NGO Capacity Building"[6] run by AYUS International Buddhist Cooperation Network provides support for the labor costs of certain staff members in order to strengthen the organization, but the target beneficiary is the position in the organization rather than the individual, and it is clear the project provides support to the organization.

Figure 4



4.2.2. Expected Participants, Actual Participants

The year following the earthquake disaster was a tumultuous one in the areas affected, and not just in terms of the situation of nonprofit organizations. There is no question that certain assumptions were made in planning this project based on the amount of experience available amidst the chaos, and that there was a need to push for the project's implementation. In retrospect, one of the most difficult issues involved the caliber of people participating in the project. A rather detailed analysis of the participants from this perspective follows.

As stated in the Implementation Outline, the target participants for this project were current and upcoming nonprofit leaders (including intermediary support organizations) in the disaster-affected areas. To repeat, the participants were expected to "possess a desire to take on a leadership role for the organization in the future and have organizational backing to take the course" (Ref: Project Summary), with the intent of strengthening the basic knowledge, management capacity and networks of nonprofit organizations through current and upcoming nonprofit leaders in the disaster-affected areas. The plan was for this group of people to actively participate in the project and apply what they learned to their organizations, thereby contributing to strengthening organizational capacity.

According to the project evaluation survey, of the presidents of participating organizations briefed about the project, Over 60% responded that they were provided an adequate explanation, but 25% said that no details were given to them or that the explanation was inadequate (Figure 5). Further, reasons such as the following were given by the organizations regarding why they participated in the project: 1) To strengthen the secretariat and its management capacity and improve staff skills (e.g. skills in negotiation, presentation and sharing), 2) To enhance the organization's work, as the project will be useful for future activities, 3) To deepen basic understanding of nonprofit organizations, 4) To interact with and share information with other organizations, build networks, and expand the organization's external outlook, and 5) The participating staff member wished to join (Figure 6). It would seem from these responses that the number of respondents stating that they had been provided an adequate explanation of the project should have been higher, but, at the very least, in terms of the organizations that understood the project's aims, their reason for joining the project and their aim to strengthen organizational capacity were almost one and the same.

Judging from the participants actually dispatched by the organizations, however, their attributes and levels of experience did not necessarily correspond with what had been anticipated. There was, in fact, great variation in these aspects, which impacted the final outcome of the project.

4.2.2.1 Participation of current leaders, upcoming leaders and others

As Appendix 6 (List of project participants and mentor matching) shows, of the 64 initial participants, 17 were presidents of their organizations, with two from Iwate, six from Miyagi and nine from Fukushima.[7] For executive directors,[8] there were four from Iwate, two from Miyagi, and three from Fukushima. In total, 41% of the participants (i.e. 17+9/64) were current leaders of their organizations when the project was launched.

Of the remaining participants, it is difficult to judge how many would fall into the category of “upcoming leader” as envisaged by this project based on information such as job title. It was possible to conclude based on mentor and project organizer interviews for the evaluation, however, that a fair number of participants were not in the position to be considered upcoming leaders. And so ultimately, there was a mix of the project participants who each fell into one of three groups: “current leader,” “upcoming leader,” and “other.” Why was this?

Figure 5



Figure 6



During the selection process, it was mainly the local project organizers in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima that explained the project to candidate organizations and encouraged them to join. These project staff recruited participants based on their shared understanding that they were to encourage the participation of leaders and upcoming leaders in these organizations (in intermediary support organizations, upcoming leaders in particular). At the time, however, a lack of understanding about nonprofit organizations was common in some of the disaster-affected areas, and many organizations were so overwhelmed by the recovery efforts that they found it difficult to send staff to participate in the project, even if they concurred with the its aim of strengthening organizational capacity.

Thus, for example, it is clear from interviews with the project staff in Iwate that they deliberately tried to recruit “younger” (i.e. less experienced) staff, and this was reinforced by their awareness of the lack of nonprofit workers there. There were also, however, a number of cases (particularly in Fukushima) wherein after being was told about the project, the organizational president him/herself signed up to join “because no one else could participate (or no one else corresponded with the target participant).”

In some situations, people joined the project despite not knowing whether they would have jobs, or even whether their organizations would still exist, the year after, as some had been urgently employed for certain projects or worked for organizations staffed mostly by the government-sponsored emergency job creation program. Though it may appear doubtful that the organizations sent participants who might serve as leaders of the future, we can, at the very least, understand that they supported the project’s aim of strengthening organizational capacity and still managed, despite the unstable situation, to send someone to participate.

Regarding the last point, as mentioned in the Implementation Outline, there were initially 64 project participants but the number fell to 45 by the time the project (including mentoring component) ended in July 2013. Regarding why there were early terminations, it appears that in a number of cases, there were major changes in the relationship between the organization and the participant, such as the latter resigning or her/his employment period coming to an end. At least three participants left due to the latter or the organization itself being dissolved, and at least nine can be regarded as having left due to differences of opinion.

Given these circumstances, there was substantial variation in the attributes and level of experiences of the participants. This led to substantial variation in people's needs in terms of mentoring (discussed below), and was a factor that complicated project management, including the issue of how to provide all participants with equal guidance.

4.2.2.2. Basic knowledge about nonprofit organizations

In addition to the actual project participants not necessarily being of the same caliber of those expected, another point that veered from the expected was the extent of their basic knowledge about nonprofit organizations, particularly in the case of people who were currently serving as leaders of their organizations. A "Transformation Checklist" was executed during the group interview as part of the post-project evaluation. Figure 7 shows what participants selected amongst four options regarding their "understanding and knowledge regarding nonprofit organizations as a whole" at the time of joining the project. It can be seen that there is no major gap between presidents/executive directors and other staff members in their self-assessment of their knowledge prior to the project's commencement. Of the 53 respondents, 12 said that they had a "considerably systematic understanding" of nonprofit organizations, whereas 41 said that they "did not have a systematic understanding/basically did not have any knowledge" (Figure 7).

This can be regarded as an unanticipated situation from the perspective of the project's conception. Attention must be given to the fact that even among the participants who were serving as presidents (i.e. incumbent leaders), quite a few were aware that they lacked basic knowledge about nonprofit organizations. Below we look at some of these indicators based on the nonprofit experience of the participants and their reasons for joining the project, using what they wrote in the evaluation survey.

First, Figure 8 shows the participants' nonprofit experience according to position. Among those with positions other than president or executive director, 54% had nonprofit experience of "less than two years" (15 out of 28 respondents) but even among those with positions of president or executive director, the ratio was 43% (12 out of 28). If we take "less than 2 years" to mean one year, "3-5 years" as four years, "6-10 years" as eight years and "over 10 years" as ten years, the mean value for nonprofit experience was 4.6 years for presidents/executive directors, and 3.3 years for those with other positions, The gap of 1.3 years between these groups is not very much.

In the survey, participants were asked an open-ended question regarding their reasons for joining the project, and responses were divided into "lack of nonprofit knowledge/experience" and "other reason."[9] Among presidents/executive directors, 36% of the total (10 out of 28 respondents) raised "lack of nonprofit knowledge/experience" as their reason for joining, and among participants with positions other than president or executive director, 42% of the total (11 out of 26) said the same (see Table 7).

Thus, not much difference can be seen between the nonprofit knowledge and experiences of the

Figure 7



Figure 8



presidents/executive directors and participants serving their organizations in other capacities. It is thought that this outcome was strongly impacted by the external factor of the timing of the project (immediately post-disaster). Table 8 examines whether there is a difference in the reasons for participating in the project depending on whether the group was founded before or after the disaster. Whereas 25% (7 out of 28) of groups established prior to the disaster raised "lack of nonprofit knowledge/experience," 52% (13 out of 25) of those established post-disaster said the same.[10] Lack of basic knowledge among the latter groups was also an issue that arose in the interviews with the project organizer, and can be gathered from the evaluation survey. Specifically, the following reasons stand out:

I was not involved in nonprofits prior to the March 11 disaster and was unfamiliar with matters such as volunteer methodology.

Since the disaster, I have wanted to broaden my understanding of nonprofits, as I am fully involved in one as my job.

It is undeniable that we lacked skills at the local nonprofit I founded after the disaster, so in addition to cultivating nonprofit know-how, I wanted to improve communications and information sharing with other nonprofits.

Because the organization was established as a result of the disaster, not only were we fuzzy on the significance of our work as a nonprofit, we were also uneasy about the instability of the organization's finances, as we operated only on funds received from the government for services it requested.

I became involved in nonprofit work after the disaster but lacked knowledge about nonprofits and organizational management, so I felt that everything might come to a standstill if I kept going this way with all the things I had to do. When I heard about this project and that I could learn about capacity building, I joined because I thought it would be a way to not only improve my knowledge to be able to carry out my tasks, but also expand the organization as a whole.

As can be seen from above, many participants, including those serving as organizational presidents, lacked knowledge about nonprofit organizations when the project began, partly due to the fact that their organizations had been established in the stricken areas soon after the disaster. Combined with the wide range in caliber of the participants, their lack of experience - a key requirement in this project for organizational capacity building - impacted the overall project outcome.

Table 7

	Lack of knowledge/ experience of non-profits	Other reasons	Total
President	8	9	17
Executive Director	2	9	11
Other Position	11	15	26
Total	21	33	54

Table 8

	Lack of knowledge/ experience of nonprofits	Other reasons	Total
Founded before Disaster	7	21	28
Founded after Disaster	13	12	25
Total	20	33	53

4.3. Transformations[11] Brought About by This Project

As this project aimed at organizational capacity building and leadership development, the most important aspect for the evaluation was to gauge the various transformations that it brought about. "Transformation Checklists" were thus developed for individuals and organizations to complete in the form of surveys. The "Transformation Checklist" can be seen in Appendix 8. One thing to note is that whereas in the case of organizational changes we tried to use indices that allowed for follow-up on objective evidence (e.g. whether a document did or did not exist), it was difficult to do the same for individual changes and use objective indicators, and we used subjective ones when necessary (e.g. whether the person understood something or not).

With such limitations, 54 of the 64 participants (including those who terminated partway) completed the Transformation Checklist, allowing for a considerably accurate report of the project outcomes. Below is an explanation of the transformations that took place in both individual and organizational participants of the project.

4.3.1. Transformations in Individual Participants

Figure 7 shows the participants' self-assessment of their knowledge and understanding of nonprofit organizations prior to the project's commencement. Figure 9, on the other hand, shows the same at the point of the project's end. Major changes can be observed by comparing the two. Of the 53 people who gave valid responses, whereas only 12 said that they had a "considerably systematic understanding" of nonprofit organizations before the project, 47 respondents said the same after it. Further, 41 participants said pre-project that they "did not have a systematic understanding/basically did not have any knowledge" of nonprofit organizations, but only six said that same after.

Apart from knowledge and understanding of nonprofit organizations, participants were asked a number of other questions in the Transformation Checklist regarding their transformation as individuals. All items were ranked in four levels, with 1 the lowest and 4 the highest. In addition, if a transformation could be seen, they were asked for a self-assessment of whether it was as a result of the project ("directly related", "somewhat related" or "unrelated").

We then attempted to quantify the project's degree of contribution to the changes based on these.

Degree of project's contribution to transformation (points) = Extent of change (0-1-2-3) x Relationship between change and project (0-1-2)

That is, if for one item (e.g. "understanding of nonprofit organizations"), the respondent gave 1 point pre-project and 4 points post-project, then 2 points for the relationship between the project and this change, then the degree of the project's contribution to transformation for this item is 6 points, which is the highest result possible. Furthermore, even if the degree of change for a particular item is 2 (between 1 and 3), if the relationship between the project and this change is only a 1 ("somewhat related"), the degree of the project's contribution to transformation is 2 points (2 x 1 = 2), and if 0 ("unrelated"), then the degree of project's contribution to transformation is 0 points (2 x 0 = 0).

Appendix 8 provides a detailed list of the items in the checklist, and a sample is shown below.

On the right-hand side of each item in the list is a column with "This transformation is related/not related to my participation in this project," and four responses are given to choose from: "directly related," "somewhat related," "unrelated" and "no change." If, for example, the participant felt pre-project that based on her/his understanding of and attitude towards nonprofit organizations, the problems of the organization seemed unclear, and that s/he was unable to understand what the issues were, but then post-project, says that "Based on my understanding of and attitude towards nonprofit organizations, I understand what the organization's problems are, and I am able to express my opinions and propose solutions regarding them," the degree of transformation is 2 degrees, from a 2 to a 4, and if this is "directly related" to the project, then the project's contribution to transformation is a factor of 2, meaning that the degree of the project's contribution to transformation is 2 degrees x factor of 4 = 4 points.

Figure 10 lists the tallied results, and the biggest transformation that can be seen among the individual participants is regarding their knowledge and understanding of nonprofit organizations. Presidents and executive directors scored 2.9 points and other participants scored 2.3 points. Regarding "Basic attitude as a person working with nonprofit organizations," the scores were 2.3 points and 2.2 points respectively. For "Understanding of organizational

Figure 7



Figure 9



Figure 10



challenges," both scored 2.1 points, and for "Extent of network," both scored 2.3 points. Generally, the degree of the project's contribution to transformation was over 2 points.

Participants made the following comments in the survey regarding changes in their consciousness:

＊I am now able to better monitor the situation of my staff and speak to them.

＊I am now able to entrust work to my staff.

＊I have been able to broaden my thoughts to consider not just the present but also the future of the organization and the staff members.

＊From running the organization to implementing projects, I now have a strong awareness as a leader rather than just as a staff member.

＊Looking ahead to the future, it has become clearer to me how to manage the organization.

＊I was able to learn about what it takes to be a leader and how to nurture human resources.

＊This was an opportunity for me to seriously think about organizational management.

＊I can now feel confident in our activities and have expectations for the future.

＊I can now think like the organization's president director and take action accordingly

＊I have become more aware about becoming actively involved in the organization (e.g. self-initiated activities).

＊I am able to understand not just my own work but also the work of the organization.

＊I am now able to organize my tasks and reset my priorities.

＊I am now able to actively plan/propose self-initiated activities and share my thoughts.

＊My attitude towards work has changed. I now think about my role in the organization and work with activities of the organization as a whole in mind.

4.3.2. Organizational Transformation

We also provided a wide array of items to check off in order to measure the degrees of transformation of the organizations, as can be found in Appendix 8. Also, in order to quantify transformations using the same measurements as those for the individual, we utilized the same scale for the degrees of

Sample of Transformation Checklist Questions (for Individual Transformations)

Please select the responses that apply to you as an individual:

	Circle what applied at the start of the project (April 2012)				Circle what applied at the end of the project (July 2013)			
1. Overall understanding and knowledge about nonprofit organizations								
1.1. Overall understanding and knowledge about nonprofit organizations	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	I had almost no knowledge or understanding	I had knowledge and understanding to some extent, but it was fragmented and not a systematic understanding	I felt that I had a considerably systematic understanding of nonprofit organizations, but that it was not being put into practice in our day-to-day activities	I had a considerably systematic understanding of nonprofit organizations and it was being put into practice in our day-to-day activities	I have almost no knowledge or understanding	I have knowledge and understanding to some extent, but it is fragmented and not a systematic understanding	I felt that I had a considerably systematic understanding of nonprofit organizations, but that it was not being put into practice in our day-to-day activities	I have a considerably systematic understanding of nonprofit organizations and it is being put into practice in our day-to-day activities
3. Organizational challenges								
based on the respondent's understanding of and attitude towards nonprofit organizations	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	I did not know what the organization's problems were	The problems of the organization seemed unclear, and I was unable to understand what the issues were	I understood what the organization's problems were, but I did not express my opinions or propose solutions regarding them	I understood what the organization's problems were, and I was able to express my opinions and propose solutions regarding them	I do not know what the organization's problems are	The problems of the organization seemed unclear, and I am unable to understand what the issues are	I understand what the organization's problems are, but I do not express my opinions or propose solutions regarding them	I understand what the organization's problems are, and I am able to express my opinions and propose solutions regarding them
4. Networks								
Links to nonprofit-related people (within and outside the prefecture) that were not directly connected to the organization's activities	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	Almost none	Just to the extent of having some acquaintances	I had some acquaintances (some quite close), but we did not really exchange information or interact with each other	I had some acquaintances (some quite close), and we found opportunities to exchange information and consult each other	Almost none	Just to the extent of having some acquaintances	I have some acquaintances (some quite close), but we do not really exchange information or interact with each other	I have some acquaintances (some quite close), and we find opportunities to exchange information and consult each other

the project's contribution to transformation. A sample is provided below:

Figure 11 shows the entire survey results. Figure 12 shows the comparison between individual and organizational transformations. Let us first look at Figure 12. Individual transformations show, by and large, a 2-point increase (e.g. 2.1 points for presidents and executive directors, 2.0 points for others), while at the organizational level it was less than 1-point. This suggests that there is twice as much of a difference between the individual and the organization in terms of the degrees of the project's contribution to transformation. Additionally, if we look at organizational transformations by staff position as compared to individual transformations, it is 1.0 point for presidents and executive directors while only 0.6 point for other staff members, suggesting that there is a greater gap at the organizational level. This clearly indicates that those who serve as the organization's president or executive director are in a position where they can more easily transform the organization than other staff members.

Let us look at Figure 11 next. If we limit ourselves to presidents and executive directors, the greatest degree of the project's contribution to transformation can be seen in the "medium-term plan" at 1.5 points, followed by 1.3 points for "division of roles among board of directors and the staff; board members' degree of involvement and sphere of authority," and 1.2 points for "collecting donations and membership dues."

Why, then, was there such a large discrepancy between the individual and organizational transformations? We could think of a few explanations. First of all, the reason may simply be that, naturally, organizations are more difficult to transform than individuals (e.g. multiple people with different personalities are involved in an organization, there is a force of habit when it comes to operating an organization, etc.). Secondly, as stated earlier, individual transformations are measured according to subjective indicators while organizational transformation includes many objective indicators that track the actual transformation after the fact. This makes it more difficult to justify that transformations have occurred, leading to the tendency to underestimate organizational transformations as a result (conversely, an overestimation of personal transformations at the same token).

However, what must be emphasized the most in this project evaluation is that the effects of this project did not automatically penetrate into the organization through the individual (i.e. a participant of this project) when the make-up of this project was as shown in Figure 4. The participants had also repeatedly mentioned this in their group interviews.

Sample of Transformation Checklist Questions (for Organizational Transformations)

Please select the appropriate responses for your organization.

	Circle what applied at the start of the project (April 2012)				Circle what applied at the end of the project (July 2013)			
1. Mission, Vision, Project Plan								
1.2. Medium-term plan	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	Did not exist	Did not exist but we were aware of its necessity	Existed but the document was not shared within the organization	The document was shared within the organization	Does not exist	Does not exist but we are aware of its necessity	Exists but the document is not shared within the organization	The document is shared within the organization
2. Governance and Management Structure								
2.2. Division of roles among board of directors and the staff; board members' degree of involvement and sphere of authority	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	Not clearly defined	Not clearly defined but we were aware of the problems that may arise from this	There was a general sense of common understanding but differences in understanding would sometimes surface	A common understanding existed within the organization	Not clearly defined	Not clearly defined but we are aware of the problems that may arise from this	There is a general sense of common understanding but differences in understanding sometimes surfaces	A common understanding exists within the organization
3. Funding Sources and Supporters								
3.2. Collecting donations and membership dues	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	Hardly collected any	Hardly collected any but we were aware of the need to do so	Collected them but they did not lead to the desired outcomes	Collected them and they led to the desired outcomes	Hardly collect any	Hardly collect any but we are aware of the need to do so	Collect them but they do not lead to the desired outcomes	Collect them and they lead to the desired outcomes

As noted earlier, the participants of this project were recruited under the premise that each organization would send one of their presidents with hopes of him/her becoming a leader who would play a significant role in the organization. There were many cases, however, where the participant was not a president of the organization, and when s/he tried to put organizational problem-solving into practice, s/he experienced difficulties with no understanding gained from her/his superiors within the organization. Reasons vary as to why this happened. Some organizations have a charismatic leader and leadership had not been successfully handed down to the next generation. Other organizational presidents may not have been prepared to hear the proposals and ideas regarding organizational change offered by the participants, even though they been the ones to send them out to join the project in the first place. In other organizations, the project participants and the core members of the organization, including the presidents, may have had different views on which issues to prioritize.

Thus, certain conditions made it difficult for the participants to put what they had learned from the project into practice and make use of them in organizational capacity building. It must be repeated here once again that in reference to this project's objective to strengthen organizational capacities, the major deciding factor regarding the project's success lay in who the staff members sent to participate, in terms of whether or not they would continue to be employed at the organization and expected to work in executive and leadership capacities.

4.3.3. Evaluating Transformations

We have compared individual and organizational transformations as stated above, but it is not easy to assess the numbers used in measuring the degrees of this project's contribution to the transformations, which were created specifically for this project evaluation to begin with, and given that there are no external measurements to compare them to. In the above paragraphs, we stated that the degree of transformation is smaller for the organization than

Figure 11



Figure 12



for the individual. However, let us take one example where the average degree of the project's contribution to transformation for the "Medium-Term Plan" was 1.5 points in the case of the participants being the organization's presidents and executive directors. This means that progress (or a 1-point transformation) was made at every organization between the stage where a medium-term plan "did not exist but we were aware of its necessity" to the stage where it "existed but the document was not shared within the organization." Additionally, it meant that half of the organizations recognized that this transformation was "directly related" to this project while the other half said that the project was "somewhat related." It depends on the subjectivity of those evaluating it to say if this was a large enough change or not, but it is safe to say that a 1-point or larger transformation can be regarded as a definite organizational transformation, and the fact that this project had created this transformation may well be considered a significant contribution to the participating organizations.

[Notes]

1. For this project evaluation, we used a 10-point evaluation scale.

2. For more information on NPS, refer to: http://www.netpromoter.com/why-net-promoter/know/, http://marketingis.jp/wiki/NPS

3.http://www.inc.com/articles/201106/whats-your-net-promoter-score.html

4. NPS has been used in part as an indicator to measure the effectiveness of nonprofit programs. For example, see: http://www.keystoneaccountability.org/node/462

5. Number of responses was 24 for the Internship Course.

6. See http://ngo-ayus.jp/ngo/ngo_support/

7. Participants who had the title of President or President of the Board of Directors at the beginning of the project.

8. As of June 2012.

9. For explanations of "lack of nonprofit knowledge/experience," we included both answers that directly address the insufficiency and also indirect reasons such as "Wanted to deepen my understanding of NPOs." All the responses are listed in Appendix 7.

10. Total numbers are not the same in Tables 7 and 8 due to some responses being incomplete.

11. In this report, we address the phenomenon observed through the "Transformation Checklist" used in this project evaluation as "transformation," making a distinction with the more generally used term "change."

=== *Chapters omitted here* ===

Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations

Thus far in this report, Chapter 2 explained the background of this project, Chapter 3 provided the project overview, Chapters 4 through 6 discussed project effectiveness, Chapter 7 presented material for assessing efficiency, and in Chapter 8 we offered our thoughts on assessment of the project relevance of nonprofit organizational capacity building for the reconstruction of the disaster-affected region. In this final chapter of the report, we will state our conclusions and recommendations.

9.1. The Characteristics of a Multifaceted Project

It need not be repeated that continuity and multiplicity are this project's major features, with its combination of various types of components. In other words, the project was not limited to capacity building group training sessions that would take place once or a few times. As such, we can foresee at least the following three effects:

1) By creating multiple points of intervention for the project, we were able to make minor adjustments for the sake of achieving the project objectives and for operation efficiency.
2) We were able to offer a model program that includes a component of mentoring, to serve as a pilot program for "accompaniment" style support.
3) We were able to ensure that relationships are maintained between the participants and the project staff, or among the mentors and participants, which can then lead to building long-term relationships based on mutual trust.

The following sections summarize the actual effects that eventuated.

9.1.1. Minor Adjustments and Major Changes in the Project

To state the first point above about making minor adjustments in a different way, we could say that this was a "think on your feet" type of project. We touched on the effects of the project's executive committee engagement in thorough discussions at the project design stage in Chapter 5. Even after implementation had begun, minor adjustments were made to the project on a daily basis, through feedback from various surveys, self-diagnosis checklists, visualization sheets, monthly reports from the mentors, and the sharing of the minutes from various meetings (with the mentors and the executive office). Also, the existence of project organizer branch offices made it possible to understand what was going on with the participants and their organizations, and to promptly respond to them as necessary.

In this sense, we could say that there were multiple, small PDCA loops [1] embedded into this project, which is something that deserves to be highly evaluated.

On the other hand, as stated in Chapter 4, there was a wider variation of characteristics and experiences among the actual participants compared to the participant pool anticipated during the project's design stage. Minor adjustments at the implementation stage could not solve this gap between, and it cannot be denied that this affected the effective implementation of the project. Also, as stated in Chapter 5, this gap also troubled the mentors in terms of the support they provided.

In the future, we recommend bringing in an element of project evaluation at three main phases of the project: in the initial stage, mid-project, and post-completion. This would mean establishing not just small PDCA loops but larger PDCA loops intertwined with the smaller ones, allowing for relatively major adjustments regarding the direction of the project to take place at each given time, instead of only minor adjustments throughout the process. The importance of undertaking continuous evaluations has been pointed out in the evaluation industry.[2] This would mean having external evaluators, if necessary, assess the project throughout the process, from the preparation stages to post-completion, beyond the scope of day-to-day monitoring. For this specific project, it may have been possible to implement some larger changes in project design at the initial review after the participants were decided.

9.1.2. The "Accompaniment" Support Model and its Future

As for the second point about our support model, we believe this to be a major contribution to the methods of strengthening nonprofit organizations and civil society, even if we have observed, in this particular project, operational problems in mentoring and action support programs, as mentioned in Chapter 5. This is a major contribution because through this experiment, we were able to present an applied example of a concrete method in nonprofit capacity building.

Even before the Great East Japan Earthquake, the limitations of capacity building projects that only take the form of group trainings had already been pointed out. These opinions had come from both within and outside the nonprofit sector, including the leaders of the Japan NPO Center, and there had already been explorations of new and more effective means for capacity building for some time. Some NPO Support Centers nationwide offered continuous support for capacity building through day-to-day consultations, using support models that could be referred to as "guide runner," "empathetic side-by-side assistance," or "attentive listener" models, and there was an awareness that such know-how needed to be generalized to some extent and shared.

When those among the nonprofit leadership became members of government committees related to civil society and the strengthening of nonprofit organizations, the "accompaniment model" of support was also discussed in those committees, and this laid the groundwork for the model to be reflected in government policies. Before the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government had become cognizant of the need to strengthen the nonprofit infrastructure. This awareness could be seen, for instance, in the proposal to dispatch specialists for the objective of building up the operational infrastructure of nonprofit organizations as one response to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration's implementation of the "New Public Commons Support Project." In 2013, under the Liberal Democratic Party administration's "Round Table for Mutual Support Society" initiative, this tradition has been passed on, and the need to improve nonprofit infrastructure and for "accompaniment-type hands-on support" has been addressed.[3]

Given this political backdrop, we believe that it was meaningful that we could present this project as one form of mentoring, as a concrete example of the "accompaniment" model of support. Of course, there could be various other ways for providing this type of support, so the push towards the sharing of knowledge and reflection on policies through further exploration and modeling are desired. We have heard from those in leadership positions of various NPO Support Centers nationwide who were involved in this project as mentors that they have developed mentor dispatch programs using our project as a reference. By conducting follow-ups of not only the participants but also the mentors for the supplementary project evaluation, we hope to include stories about these developments in our collection of case studies.

Furthermore, at NPO Support Centers nationwide, consultation programs, along with workshops and training sessions as well as exchange and networking programs, have been recognized as "soft programs" (i.e. all programs except facility management and operation) that the centers hope in the future to make central to their operations, while also being aware of the difficulties in making profit.[4]

At the group interview of mentors for this project review, some mentioned that even though the "accompaniment" model requires effort and funds, it is difficult to find grants and subsidies to cover them, and trying to set up a fee structure that would recover at least some of the costs had become a source of distress. The level of financial and human resources invested into this project, as shown in Chapter 7, would be a reference point for forming "accompaniment" support model programs in the future.

It is vital that the effects of the "accompaniment" support model be measured, made visible, and information shared so that the amount of this type of support grows. It is also vital to meet the funding needs by creatively combining internal and external funding sources to ensure continuous project development. In order to achieve these goals, it becomes important to develop indicators to measure the quality of mentoring as well as the growth of those on its receiving end. Also, we contrasted the characteristics of the "accompaniment" model support project, using mentoring as an example, with organizational consultation support in Chapter 8, but this requires further deliberations as well. We can only propose support options that are truly appropriate for the conditions of the local community or the developmental stage of the organization once this is done.

9.1.3. Building and Strengthening the Community

As for the third point about relationships being built and maintained, we have already touched on this point in Chapter 4. The sense of camaraderie that has grown out of this project can lead to a community being formed where members can consult each other on nonprofit operations across specialty areas, and the signs of this budding community can already be seen in the participant-led seminars that have been continuously held as part of this project. At a seminar in March 2014 on the topic of reviewing organizational activities through the perspectives of external bodies, one participant made an illuminating comment on the huge potential of communities such as these: “It was very helpful to hear frank opinions regarding how people outside of our organization comprehend what we are saying. I cannot find anyone else external to my organization, with no ties to us at all, who can give me reliable and precise feedback. I think this was only possible for this group.” As many participants, mentors, and project staff have mentioned in the project evaluation interviews, a project that is set up in the same way as this project will not see all its results as soon as the project comes to an end. In the future, making the effects of this project more visible will be possible by creating a framework and indicators for continuous review and by using these at the local level.

9.2. The Variable of Crisis[6]

In this section, let us be reminded once again that this project arose from the unprecedented disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake. There is no doubt that this variable of crisis that resulted from the disaster greatly affected the project. Let us sort out what lessons were learned from this.

9.2.1. Fluidity of the Situation

At the group interviews in the three prefectures, we asked the participants what April 2012 was like for them when the project started. These responses have been compiled and presented in Chapter 2, but it is worth noting that the comments included that is was “a second period of confusion” and “a time when the needs of the survivors were becoming less visible.” It also goes without saying that local nonprofits were at their busiest at this time, with both the external environment and the internal situation of the organization (i.e. people, money, physical surroundings) were largely unstable, while external human and financial resources continued to pour in.

We must reconfirm here that this project was conducted under highly fluid conditions, and therefore some of the phenomena noted in this report (such as variation among the experience levels of the participants, high attrition rate of participants, low number of participants who used the available support offered to them, etc.) have been heavily affected by the variable of fluidity. Therefore, we must emphasize that if, in the future, similar projects are to be planned as part of a disaster response, this variable of fluidity must be included in the project execution plans.

9.2.2. From Emergency to Normal Times

At the same time, however, as shown in Chapter 3, the period of a year after the disaster meant that it was a period during which social problems that had existed prior to the disaster began to resurface. We stated in Chapter 8 that for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, during the transition from the early recovery period (4-5 years post disaster) to the full-fledged restoration period (6-10 years post disaster), nonprofit activities also transitioned from emergency responses to activities implemented during normal times.

It warrants attention, once again, that the project objective that arose from the disaster, of nonprofit capacity building and developing leaders, must be put in the context of this flow from emergency to normal times. If local nonprofit leaders are to be the bearers of the responsibility to build strong communities, then what they must acquire goes beyond the skills of simply running nonprofit organizations. They must have the capacity to foresee the future, as they anticipate the changing times, consider the needs of the near future, and run the organization and move its projects forward accordingly. Moreover, despite the need for a medium to long-term stance, disaster response funds often have short-term (and sometimes even myopic) conditions attached. One must be even more aware of these changes than one would in normal times when running projects to strengthen organizational infrastructure during the reconstruction period.

9.2.3. Flexibility in Program Operation

We have already noted the variety of characteristics and experiences of the participants in this project, and this will not stand corrected. However, when running a disaster response project where there is no choice but to operate the project in a “think on your feet” manner under highly fluid conditions, those running the project are required to be shrewd and create assets from the unexpected.

In drafting this report, we collected comments from people who were involved in the project in one way or another, and one participant sent in the following. This comment hints at the appeal of developing projects that target actual people:

Among projects targeting local nonprofits in the affected areas of the Great East Japan Earthquake, it is rare in the first place to even find a next generation of leaders who are established in the organization. More often than not, the organizations themselves have been vulnerable and unstable. If the candidates for this project had been screened more rigorously based on certain conditions and qualifications, it would have meant that, in the end, only organizations that already had somewhat strong infrastructure to begin with would be further strengthened, while other organizations would not be given the chance for growth. It would have been a very limiting project. In this sense, I was grateful that the opportunity was granted to someone like me, to learn and grow, and I think it is of major significance that the selection of participants allowed this flexibility.

9.2.4. Role of Intermediary Support Organizations

From the initial response to the recovery phases of disaster response, it is clear that local volunteer centers and NPO Support Centers have a large role to play in providing coordination support. However, through this project review process, the importance of taking great pains to secure local intermediary support functions, including the "accompaniment" model support, in the path towards post-disaster reconstruction in the medium to long term has emerged. As stated above, part of this is the responsibility that local support centers bear in leading the growth of "accompaniment" model support programs. Another part, however, has been clear from the experience of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake - that "intermediary support organizations are expected to lead the improvements to the systems and structures by engaging in research and proactively making policy proposals."[7] It is normal to experience difficulties in attracting funding for these intermediary support functions, so it makes it all the more vital to assert their necessity and effects to all concerned parties.[8]

9.3. Towards Establishing an Evaluation System that Makes Project Outcomes Visual

On a final note, in the future, when the Japan NPO Center and other NPO Support Centers nationwide engage in improvements or projects to strengthen nonprofit infrastructures, we recommend that goal setting (or an evaluation plan, to take it a step further) be implemented at the very beginning, making use of this project evaluation as a model.

This project may well be considered unique as a disaster recovery-related project, even just for the fact that considerable funds were used in the evaluation of a single project. However, as noted in the *15 Management Capabilities* workbook, it is essential to the healthy operation of a nonprofit organization to routinely engage in organizational evaluations and project evaluations as appropriate. By effectively using what is learned from such evaluations, the organization can move closer to achieving its mission. At the Japan NPO Center, we expect to see synergistic effects among our projects as we engage in the combined evaluation of multiple projects, including the second phase of this project that involves providing support for the improvement of organizational capacity, other disaster recovery-related projects, and organizational capacity building initiatives.

From the outset, with projects with orientations such as this, it is natural to see outcomes materialize only after some time had passed since the project's end. By measuring such outcomes by organization's size, membership, proposal-making skills, planning skills, execution skills, stability, retention of people (staff members), or quality and quantity of external communication, we can continue reporting on the outcomes. Part of this will be presented in the collection of case studies - the outcome of this project's supplementary project evaluation.

We are not too far from the day when it will be the norm in running projects to have an evaluation framework created for all stages of the project, and to have them discussed and shared with all parties involved. In order to accelerate the setting of this norm, we need multi-layered dissemination and policymaking activities, including activities to raise the awareness of the funders.

[Notes]

1. PDCA Cycle. Project management terminology, indicating a method for project improvement through repeating the four cycles of a project: Plan, Do, Check, and Act.

2. Differing from the general summative evaluation, this is called a utilization-focused evaluation due to the fact that it focuses on the “learning” of the users of the evaluation. For example, see Michael Quinn Patton (2008) *Utilization-Focused Evaluation, 4th ed.* [Sage Publications].

3. For example, see “Towards the Promotion of a Mutual Support Society”:
https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/pdf/report33_matome.pdf

4. Japan NPO Center (August 2013) *2012 NPO Support Center Field Survey Report*, pp. 22-23.

5. Comment made by a participant at a participant-led seminar in Fukushima on March 13, 2014.

6. We are grateful for the feedback given to us by WVJ regarding the draft. This feedback was used as a hint in organizing the issues to which we have referred in this section of the report. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the arguments developed in this section is that of the author alone.

7. *Ibid.* (See Chapter 8, Note 8) p.191.

8. For example, similar comments have been made at a field meeting of the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN) [The 9th Miyagi Field Meeting, February 18, 2014].
See:http://www.jpn-civil.net/2013/hisaichi/genchi_kaigi/140218_miyagi.html

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